In this paper, we study the economic implications of the trade off between growth and environment in the context of dynamic models of capital accumulation. The collective solution is formulated in terms of dynamic optimization of the central planner, and the decentralized solution is formulated in terms of differential game between workers and capitalists. We compare the economic properties of two solutions.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, a lot of works on environmental economics from the dynamic perspectives have been accumulated. Early pioneering examples are Keeler et al. (1971) , M/iler (1974) , and Clark (1976) . More recent contributions are, among others, Forster (1980) , Uzawa (1995) , Hartl and Kort (1996) and Hettich (2000) . They investigated the economic implications of the government's environmental policies by applying mathematical techniques of dynamic optimization. Usually, models in such a tradition are formulated in terms of single agent optimization problems. Recently, however, analyses of the conflict of interests between several agents in terms of (dynamic and static) games in the context of environmental economics have been developed. We can refer to Dockner et al. (1989) , Dockner and van Long (1993) , M/iler and de Zeeuw (1998) , Stimming (1999) and Uzawa (1999) as important examples. They developed the gametheoretical approaches, which can analyze the conflict of interests between fishermen, between government and private sector, or between countries, and the effects of the cooperative and noncooperative behaviors of economic agents on the global environment were investigated. Dynamic games (in particular, differential games) are powerful tools to study such a theme. f
In this paper, we also consider a game-theoretical approach of the environmental economics from the dynamic perspective, but we put much emphasis on a rather neglected aspect in the environmental economics. We focus on the conflict of interests between two major classes in the capitalist economy, i.e. workers and capitalists. We introduce the environmental factor into the analytical framework of the "differential game of capitalism" which was initiated by Lancaster (1973) 's pioneering paper and developed by Hoel (1978) , Pohjola (1983) , Mehrling (1986) and Ishigaki (1994) and investigate the economic implications of the solutions.:
This paper is organized as follows. In second section, we introduce the environmental factor into a very simple model of capital accumulation in which the rate of economic growth is determined endogenously, and the "collective solution", which means the solution of the central planner's dynamic optimization problem, is studied by means of the optimal control technique. In third section, we formulate a "differential game of capitalism" between workers and capitalists, and consider the open loop Nash solution as a typical solution of such a *Corresponding author. E-mail: asada@tamacc.chuo-u.ac.jp 'As for the survey of the differential game approach to the transboundary pollution problem, see Inoue (1998 
where C is the total real consumption, N is the labor employment, P is the stock of pollution, p is the rate of discount which is assumed to be a positive constant, and it is assumed that In this case, we have
U
As for the technology, we assume the fixed technological coefficients. That is to say,
where a is the output-capital ratio and b is the labor-capital ratio, and they are assumed to be constant. We also assume that R=I=S=sY (0=<s-< 1),
where I is the real investment, S is the real saving, and s is the saving rate which is to be controlled by the central planner.
Substituting Eq. (3) into Eqs. (4) and (5), we have
where g =--R/K is the rate of capital accumulation (the rate of economic growth). We further assume that the stock of pollution (P) is proportional to the capital stock (K), but P also depends positively on the rate of economic growth (g Max H(t) for all >--0.
It will be shown in third section that in our model the open loop Nash solution is also the feedback Nash solution.
}Y is the real national income (real output) and K is the real physical capital stock. It follows from Eq. (3) that N bK, which implies that the labor employment is constrained by the existing capital stock, so that in general the full employment of labor will not be satisfied. We assume the labor-surplus economy in which the labor supply does not become a constraint of the production. Obviously, unemployment in our model is not the "Keynesian" unemployment which is due to insufficient effective demand but the "classical" unemployment which is due to insufficient capital stock.
IIAs for the Pontryagin's maximum principle, see, for example, Chiang (1992) .
It follows from Eq. (15) (17) -b/{ 1 s(t)} e < 0ifs(t)6[0, 1). (18) If we assume the internal solution, Eq. (16) 
which is a differential equation with only variable, s(t). We obtain 
PROPOSITION
Under Assumption 1, the only optimal solution of the problem Eq. (14) is given by
where s* (0, 1) is the unique stationary solution of Eq.
(20).
PROPOSITION 2 0s*/0(cq3) < 0.
PROOF We have
Now, let us assume as follows.
Under Assumption 1 (i) we obtain Therefore, we have the following expression in view of Eq. (21) by totally differentiating the equation F(s*; aft) 0.
Under (31) in other words, the increase of the marginal disutility of pollution for the planner (ce) or the increase of the pollution effect of economic growth (/3) will induce the decrease of the optimal rate of economic growth. Obviously, this is the reasonable conclusion.
adversely, and it is assumed that the capitalists' welfare only depends on their own real consumption and real capital stock.
Eqs. (3) and (8) 
In this formulation, we introduce the asymmetrical effect of the environmental pollution on the welfare of two classes. To stress the asymmetrical effect, we simply assume that the pollution affects only workers' welfare where z is the share of wages in national income, Sk is the capitalists' average propensity to save, and is the real profit. Following Lancaster (1973) , Hoel (1978) , Pohjola (1983) , Mehrling (1986) , Ishigaki (1994) 
fl (z(t), sk(t); ceil) [log z(t) + log a log b (ceil/b){ 1 + Sk(t)(1 z(t))a }]b, f2(z(t), sk(t)) log{ 1 Sk(t)} %-log{ 1 z(t)}
+ log a. In this formulation, we follow the hypothesis of the "spirit of capitalism" which was introduced by Robson (1992) and Bakshi and Chen (1996) . In their formulation, capitalists' utility depends not only on their consumption but also on their social standing which is symbolized by their wealth. In this model, their wealth is represented by the real capital stock (K) and it is assumed that capitalists' utility is linear homogeneous with respect to CK and K.
Both classes are subject to the common dynamic constraint which is given by (iii) lim A2(t) exp(-pt) 0.
R(t) sic(t){ 1 z(t)}aK(t),
Now, let us consider the simplest solution concept of the (noncooperative) differential game, i.e. the "open loop Nash solution". It is defined as the path ((t),ic(t)) (t[0,o)) which satisfies the following conditions for all piecewise continuous paths with respect to time, (z(t), sic(t)) (t[0, oo)). "' First, let us consider the solution of workers' problem. We have
(53) (54) If we assume the internal solution, Eq. (50)(i) becomes ilHl(t)/Sz(t) 0, so that we obtain AI (t) (b/a)/z(t)sic(t) / ce/sic(t) =-A1 (z(t), sic(t)) (i) Wl((t), ic(t)) >_--Wl(z(t),
(ii) W2((t),ic(t)) >= W2((t), sic (t) 
F1 (Z(t), sic(t); o/3
We obtain the following relationships.
Max H1 (t) for all -->_ 0
On the other hand, capitalists' current value Hamiltonian (H2(t)) is oz/3a{ 1 z(t)} {p/sk(t)2}{(b/a)/z(t) + cq3} (59) E =--OF/O(ce) 1 + sic(t){ 1 z(t)}a > 0 (60) Assumption 2(i) and 2(iv) are in fact equivalent to Assumption l(i) and l(ii) in the previous section.
Assumption 2(ii) and 2(iii) will be satisfied if cfl is relatively small.
It follows from Assumption 2(i) that lim F1 (z(t), s(t); ceil) +c for s(t)e(0, 1 ].
On the other hand, Assumption 2(iv) implies that there exists the level of the capitalists' saving propensity Ye(0, 1) such that Fl(1,s(t); aft) < 0 for alls(t)6(g, 1]. (64) It is clear that under Assumption 2, there exists the unique solution z(t) (0, 1) of Eq. (57) when s(t) is fixed at the level s(t)(3, 1] (see Fig. 2 ). In this case, we can express the solution of Eq. (57) where A =--dA/ds(t) and B dB/dsk(t).
We can prove that the workers' optimal policy is in fact given by Eq. (65) when s(t)(5, l] is fixed. We can consider the function l(s(t); aft) as workers' response function. Figure 3 is an example of such a function.
## It is clear that the function qb in Fig. 3 shifts upward when cq3 increases.
Next, let us solve the capitalists' problem. From Eqs. (46) and (51) we have and OH2(t)/Osk(t) [-- Therefore, the first order condition of Eq. (52)
Substituting Eq. (68) into Eq. (52)(ii), we have s(t) q,2(z(t)); (z(t)) < o (71) Equation (71) is capitalists' response function, which gives the capitalists' optimal policy when z(t)e[0,z') is fixed. Figure 4 is an example of such a function. The combination (z*, s) which corresponds to the intersection of workers' response function (@1) and capitalists' response function (@2) gives the open loop Nash solution in this system, and the equilibrium rate of economic growth (g*) is endogenously determined by The method of the proof of this proposition is almost the same as that of the proof of Proposition 1. ##In general, the sign of 021)1/OSk(t) is indeterminate.
Capitalists' response function.
FIGURE 6 Comparative dynamic analysis. Figure 6 shows that the intuition is not supported for the solution b (solution with low growth rate and low pollution) although the intuition is supported for the solution a (solution with high growth rate and high pollution).*** This result seems to suggest that the realistic "decentralized" solution with the conflict of interests between different agents is much more complicated than the "collective" solution which is simply formulated in terms of the optimization problem of the single agent.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have studied two dynamic models of capital accumulation with environmental factors, and investigated the economic implications of the trade off between growth and environment. In particular, we have shown that the differential game approach can contribute to reveal some aspects which have been rather neglected so far in the environmental economics. In this paper, however, we have not considered the economic activity that eliminates the environmental pollution although we ***As for the concept of the feedback Nash solution, see Bagchi (1984) , Basar and Olsder (1995) and Ishigaki (1994) . **tIn Appendix B, we present a tatonnement process in which the point a is stable and the point b is unstable. However, we must not interpret this process as the actual development through time. Therefore, it is not the reliable foundation to exclude the "counterintuitive" equilibrium solution.
have introduced the adverse effect of economic growth on the environment. Economic analysis of the activity which eliminates the environmental pollution in the dynamic context is the theme which is left to the study in future. Stimming, M. (1999) Let us define the function G(s(t)) as G(s(t)) =-f(s(t))+ A s(t)a.
Then, the function G(s(t)) becomes a strict concave function since G"(s(t))=f"(s(t))= -b/{ 1 s(t)} 2 < 0. discrete dynamical system with one period time lag.
z(t) 1 (Sk(t 1); cq3), Sk(t + 1)--qz(Z(t)), z(t + 2) '/1 (sk(t + 1); S(t + 3) qz(Z(t + 2)),...
where the strict inequality in Eq. (A8) is satisfied if (t) # s for some >--0 because of the piecewise continuity of (t) with respect to t. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
APPENDIX B
Let us reformulate the response functions of two classes z(t) @ (s(t); cq3) and s(t) cI92(z(t)) as the following
We suppose that these adjustments do not occur simultaneously, but they occur sequentially. We must interpret this adjustment process as the tatonnement algorithm that tries to solve the equilibrium solution by iteration rather than the picture of the actual development through time. As Fig. 7 shows, under this (hypothetical) adjustment process, the point a (high growth, high pollution equilibrium) is stable, while the point b (low growth, low pollution equilibrium) is unstable.
